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The Honorable J. Robert Bullock, Judge 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE.OF UTAH 
CITY OF PAYSON, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. Case No. 7165 
RICHARD C. PROVSTGAARD, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
The defendant was charged by the City of Payson for driving 
under the influence of an intoxicating liquor. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The matter was tried to a law trained judge in the Justice 
of the Peace Court. From a judgment of guilty, the defendant 
obtained a trial de nova to the District Court. The District 
Court, in a trial by jury, found the defendant guilty of driving 
under the influence of intoxicating liquor. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON AN APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks for reversal of the conviction by reason of 
the fact that the trial court gave 
-1-
the jury erroneous 
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instructions, and that as a matter of law there was insufficient 
evidence of the defendant's being under 
I 
the influence of 
intoxicating liquor to submit that question to the jury. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties have stipulated to the following facts: 
an 
"On or about the 15th day of September, 1978, the defendant 
was stopped in Payson City for a speeding violation, but was 
subsequenty charged with driving under the influence of an 
'intoxicating liquor' The defendant admits that prior to the 
time of his being stopped that he had consumed approximately a 
six-pack of Utah 'light beer', which by weight consisted of 3.2% 
or less of alcohol, as the same is defined by statute. Defendant 
submitted to a breath test which indicated that he had a .10 
'blood alcohol' content. 
"A narrow and singular issue is to be presented [back] [sic] 
to the Court on appeal, namely, is the consumption of light beer, 
as defined by the statutes of this state, to be considered an 
'intoxicating liquor' for the purposes of Title 41-6-44(a)." 
At the conclusion of the city's case, defendant moved for a 
dismissal of the charge on the grounds that the city had not 
proven that defendant was under the influence of any intoxicating 
liquor, but the court denied the same. 
-2-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO A DIRECTED VERDICT AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
As indicated by the stipulated facts, the only evidence the 
City introduced at the trial was that the defendant had consumed 
some light beer. Plaintiff acknowledges that light beer is an 
alcoholic beverage, and that the 1977 Legislature made it an 
offense for a person to operate a motor vehicle under the 
influence of an alcoholic beverage, (see 41-6-44.5, U.C.A., 1953 
as amended) . However, previously the parent Statute of 41-6-
44.5, only made it an offense to drive under the influence of an 
intoxicating liquor. For reasons of its own, Payson City chose 
to prosecute defendant for operating a motor vehicle under the 
influence of an "intoxicating liquor" rather than under the 
influence of an "alcoholic beverage". Th us, the question of 
defendant being under the influence of an alcoholic beverage is 
not and was not before the court. The city chose to charge the 
defendant with being under the influence of a "liquor", and that 
is what the city had to prove. 
There is only one section in the Utah Code that defines what 
the words "liquor," "light beer," "alcoholic beverage," etc. 
means. Those definitions are set forth in 32-1-3, u.C.A., 1953 
cis a1oer1cled, J:; follows: 
brr 
"Alcoholic beverage" means and includes "beer" and 
liquor as they are defined herein. 
"Light Beer" means beer containing not more than 
-3-
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3.2 per centum of alcohol by weight. 
"Liquor" means and includes alcohol or any 
alcoholic spirituous. drinks or drinkable liquids . 
• ; except that the term "liquor" shall not tnclude 
1 ight beer. ( EmphasTs added). 
It is thus clear that it was and still is the legislative 
intent to exlude "light beer" from the term "liquor". Perhaps 
that is the reason why in 1977, the legislature chose to 
substitute the term "alcohol" for the term "intoxicating liquor" 
throughout the entire "drunk driving" Statute (41-6-44, u.C.A.), 
That is a further indication that the legislature recognizes the 
difference between the legislatively limited scope of the term 
"intoxicating 1 iquor" and the broader legislative interpretation 
of the term "alcohol". 
The charge against the defendant is a statutory criminal 
offense. By choosing to charge the defendant with being under 
the influence of an intoxicating liquor, the city was obligated 
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was in fact 
under the influence of an intoxicating liquor and not merely 
under the influence of an alcoholic beverage. When the city was 
unable to prove the consumption or use by defendant of any 
intoxicating liquor, as defined by Statute, the city had not met 
its burden and defendant was entitled to a directed verdict, as 
to the offense charged. By stipulation it is agreed that 
defendant had only consumed "light beer" as the same is defined 
by the legislature. Since light beer is not a "liquor", by 
statutory definition, and since the city chose to charge the 
defendant with the offense of being under the influence of 
"liquor", as opposed to being under the influence of alcohol, the 
-4-
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trial court should have either directed a verdict of acquittal, 
or, it should have specifically instructed the jury that in 
making its determination as to whether or not the defendant was 
under the influence of an intoxicating liquor, that they could 
not consider any consumption of light beer by the defendant. 
POINT II 
AN UNAMBIGUOUS STATUTE SHOULD NOT BE CONSTRUED OR REDEFINED SO AS 
TO STATE A CRIME. 
Payson City chose the statutory language it wished to enforce 
against the defendant, i.e., that the defendant was under the 
influence of an intoxicating liquor. The city simply could not 
prove the same. Defendant acknowledges that there are statutory 
provisions that the defendant might have been charged under, 
namely, driving under the influence of "an alcoholic beverage", 
( 41-6-44. 5), and that the defendant's consumption of the light 1 
beer in the amount stipulated to would have been sufficient 
evidence for the court to submit to the jury the question of 
determining if the defendant was under the influence of an 
alcoholic beverage. However, inasmuch as the unambiguous statute 
must be construed to mean what the legislature says it does, the 
trial court erred in not instructing the jury to either exclude 
evidence of the consumption of the light beer, or in ordering 
that the jury return a verdict of acquittal. The fact remains 
that the legislature chose to exlude "light beer" from the term 
of liquor (See U.C.A. 32-1-3). There is no ambiguity in that 
statute. The 1977 legislature apparently recognized the 
-5-
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anonymity of the legislated restrictive term "intoxicating liquor 
when it changed the drunk driving statute by substituting 
"alcohol" for "intoxicating liquor". Payson City apparently did 
not recognize the difficulty and continued to use the "old" or 
former statutory language. The city having chose to enforce the 
state "drunk driving" statute is bound by the definitions 
pronounced or made by the legislative body that formulated the 
statute, including what liquor is or is not. The position of the 
city herein is somewhat similar to that of the State of Utah in 
State ~ Archuletta, 526 P.2d 911, where this court held: 
There is nothing ambiguous about the Statute in the 
instant matter, it simply does not state a crime, and 
we are not empowered to state one for the legislators 
simply because it seems certain that they intended to 
state one themselves. 
In Payson City ~ Provstgaard, the city had a choice of 
pursuing the defendant under Section 41-6-44(a), which made it 
illegal for a person to drive on a public highway under the 
influence of an alcoholic beverage, or under Section 41-6-44.5 
which made it illegal for a person to drive or in actual physical 
control of any vehicle with a blood alcohol content of .10% or 
greater. Notwithstanding those statutory provisions, the city 
chose to prosecute defendant for being under the influence of 
liquor. The city thus had a burden of proof to establish the 
consumation by defendant of more than an alcoholic beverages, 
i.e., the consumption of liquor, and the City simply could not, 
and did not meet that burden. 
SUMMARY 
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The appellant contends: inasmuch as it is agreed by 
stipulation and by Statutory definition that the defendant was 
not under the influence of an intoxicating "liquor"; and, because 
of the need not to construe an unambiguous statute to mean 
something different than what it expressly provides, that the 
conviction by the jury in the trial court, should be ordered 
reversed, and the matter remanded to the trial court to enter a 
judgment of acquittal. 
DATED this f5't{1 day of October, 1979. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
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